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Reading from _An Essay on Man_(Cassirer) 002

_An Essay on Man_, Cassirer. Bantam Books, NY, January 1970.

Part I: What is Man?
Chapter I: The Crisis in Man's Knowledge of Himself.
Section 2, pp. 6 – 14.

The moral obligation of self-criticism established by Socrates is extended and given universal and metaphysical significance by the Stoics including Marcus Aurelius. The inner harmony achieved and maintained through Socratic self-examination is regarded as an articulation of the principle that the order of the universe also “puts into evidence” (Veblen). This principle locates that which is truly real in the unchanging and unchangeable inner and outer forms that are disclosed and apprehended through the human's engagement with indeterminate life through her power of judgment. She achieves a harmony with and a moral independence from nature with the exercise of judgment and reason. But Christianity rejects this self-sufficiency and independence based on reason, and in this rejection can be seen the conflict between spiritual powers that characterizes anthropological philosophy (i.e. revelation vs. reason). Augustine, in particular, asserts the primacy of her capacity to receive the revealed wisdom of God over the vain dependence upon inherently faulty human reason. The medieval concept of man was thoroughly conditioned by the principle that only the understanding extended by God through grace can resolve the inconsistencies and limitations of human intellect. Even into the modern period, there emerges a scientific thinker of immense stature in the person of Pascal who nevertheless denies science the spiritual primacy that it is beginning to assume. He recognizes that the contradictory nature of man cannot be given a mathematical or logical formulation because these intellectual powers reject the possibility of contradiction in their most fundamental assumptions. Thus, Pascal feels compelled to defer to religion as the only legitimate expression of the contradictions and mysteries that characterize the human capacity for both sin and salvation and her relation to God. It seems, however, that the expectation, if not demand, that the human spirit be free of contradiction is still very much with us. Indeed, much of our thought seems to be based on an almost naive form of “scientific” objectivity that is achieved by eliminating and abstracting out all subjectivity. As Cassirer points out in a number of places, this minimization of the subjective is an indispensable condition for the articulation of the type of objectivity that is characteristic of the “precise” sciences like physics, but it cannot be applied to the cultural sciences in the same way or to the same extent. The mere rhetorical or theoretical denial of human inconsistency does not confer scientific validity, but tends to dismiss and trivialize moral and other human considerations as unscientific inconsistencies. And to the extent that this forced appropriation of the conditions and methods of physics and chemistry is successful, to the extent that morality and humanity are excluded and denied their objective value, our sense of reality is, ironically, undermined as we approach the dubious ideal of an “impersonal” objectivity. The moral component of human life, again as Cassirer is stating, is an integral component of reality, of its stability and objective value, and to attempt to eliminate it is to cause the ground to move under our feet.

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