Skip to main content

Reading from _An Essay on Man_(Cassirer) 004

_An Essay on Man_, Cassirer. Bantam Books, NY, January 1970.

Part I: What is Man?
Chapter I: The Crisis in Man's Knowledge of Himself.
Section 4, pp. 18 – 24.

Quote from Diderot, p. 18-19 (Google translation):
We are touching the moment of a great revolution in the sciences. To the penchant that spirits seem to me to have in morality, in fine letters, in the history of nature, and in experimental physics, I would almost dare to assure that before it is a hundred years old, three great geometers will not be counted in Europe. This science will stop at a moment when Bernoulli, Euler, Maupertuis, and d'Alembert have left it. They will have laid the pillars of Hercules, and we will not go beyond them.”

Because of some reservations concerning Enlightenment thought, Diderot asserted that the opportunities for mathematical innovation had been largely exhausted. He was, of course, proven wrong by the continued progress of mathematics and mathematical science throughout the nineteenth century. However, he did anticipate the decline of the search for a mathematical anthropology, which was displaced by biological theories of evolution that promised to unify humanity and nature on a sound material basis that dispensed with abstract speculation. Evolutionary theory was indeed successful in integrating humanity into the general stream of organic life that is guided by chance, but accounting for humanity's spiritual life with this bio-empirical methodology reduces culture to a product of nature that is essentially the same as, albeit more complex than, the spider's web or the bird's nest. Can this identification of human cultural work with animal behavior be thought of, in a sense, as an extension of Luther's identification of contemplation and labor, which merged economic activity with cultural work and creativity? This empirical approach certainly generates an impressive inventory of human faculties and achievements, but no self-evident principle that integrates these data into a disclosure of a unified human nature emerges of its own accord. Empiricism and inductive reasoning are typical of profit-mentality because of their emphasis on the acquisition of data and the corresponding dismissal of the relevance or even possibility of an over-arching theoretical formulation that might both facilitate the identification of pertinent information and provide the interpretive framework that would give the collected data meaning (this theoretical guidance and significance must be found in and based on the assumptions of economic essentialism). Furthermore, I think that this anti-intellectual empiricism corresponds to the dismissal of the importance of collective cultural works in, among other places, Hayek's epistemology (where knowledge is constrained to that which can be grasped directly while phenomena such as language are irrelevant or inaccessible and mysterious because they cannot belong to an individual or limited group of owners). Ideas such as the “invisible hand”, spontaneous order and an all-embracing, impersonal market mechanism seem to be more specific but still quasi-mystical notions that deflect philosophical critique in order to sustain the empirical rationale of maximizing the accumulation of data that, ostensibly, will generate its own unifying and interpretive principle when some “critical mass” of information is reached. This “preservation of mystery and adventure” (Romney campaign speech - “...saving the excitement...” of business competition, etc.) ultimately serves to shield the economic essentialism that stands in for genuine philosophical scrutiny. The source of meaning in the symbolic nature of human intellect and action cannot be acknowledged by the materialism, albeit it a “functional materialism”, of the economic thought and action that dominates our culture because that primacy would be undermined if economics were disclosed as only a part, and not the whole, of culture. This accumulative methodology operates as an intellectual and “scientific” counterpart to the other forms of maximization that pervade our lives. In contradiction of their presumed foundation in pure fact, these inductive theories are forced by the desire for a coherent anthropology to assume one of these capacities as the integrating anthropological principle and defend its precedence over all other human powers. Again, determination and objectivity (specifically, here, in the form of a “coherent anthropology”) cannot be understood as culturally generated from the empirical/material perspective. Necessity and reality must be “given” from without, and must be devoid of any distorting subjective elements (i.e., the semblance of material objectivity is created in part by the appropriation of the formulaic elimination of subjectivity by scientific vision). As Cassirer points out, however, even materialism is a cultural determination; it is dependent upon a lack of awareness or an ignorance of its symbolic and cultural nature, as is the case with mythical substantialism. I contend that economic essentialism and profit-mentality cultivate this ignorance to sustain their spiritual primacy. The present crisis in the understanding of human nature results from this fragmentation which seems absolute and apparently precludes the development of a concept of the human which can serve as a touchstone for knowledge. Here we may even see profit-mentality making virtues out of the consequences of this crisis, as the fragmentation of knowledge is transformed into "competitive opportunities" and new “callings”, as every fragment can apparently be made into the content of a separate discipline by an ambitious and charismatic intellectual (recall Fukuyama's “Last Man”). All of this is to say that man is so completely problematic to himself because his expectation of a material and substantial form of objectivity, by definition, excludes the functional and symbolic aspects of culture that constitute the answer to the question “What is man?”. And, as the personality of the individual theorist becomes decisive in the context of this philosophical disarray, the conflict between views and perspectives comes to threaten the human spirit at its ethical core – man has never been “more problematic to himself than in our own days.”(Scheler). In other words, we have collected and assembled an unprecedented amount of data and information pertaining ourselves, but we have failed to find our humanity in it.

Comments